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Abortion- Part X 
A Legal Review 
. Rt.' Rev. Msgr. Paul V. Harrington, J.C.L. . 
It will be interesting and important 
to inquire what status the civil law, in 
its development , has accorded to the 
unborn fetus. In general, this will be 
investigated with specific reference to 
the rights accorded to the fetus under 
· the common law, under the statutory 
law of the individual states and by 
reason of the interpretation of the law 
by various . courts . in their judicial 
decisions. 
One must keep in mind that the law 
and legal jurisprudence necessarily 
depend upon the medical sciences for 
the knowledge and information which 
is required for . the determination and 
verification of conception , the 
beginning of human life , the nature , 
growth a nd · development of 
intra-uterine life , the duration of 
pregnancy , the problems and 
complications of pregnancy and the 
entire process of delivery. 
Obviously , the law can never be 
ahead of medical research but must 
always await the findings of science 
and allow sufficient time for their 
confirmation and proven worth. It will 
take some period of time for the 
experimental conclusions to be printed 
in the text books and journals and to 
be absorbed by the lawyers and jurists, 
who ultimately will find the proper 
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cases and circumstances to 
invoke the new data. A ve. 
example of this woulc.~ 
determination of pregnan, 
1ply and 
obvious 
be the 
. Before 
the c~rtain , probable and r mmptive 
signs of pregnancy were ' termined 
relatively recently , the o· ,i certain 
indication of a pregnane was the 
actual movement of the c :d within 
the· mother. This would m .Uy occur 
about the fourth mont!· and was 
referred to as "quicke :1g" and 
the mother was described !S "quick 
with child." Since this w· the first 
certain sign that a pregnaL f actually 
was in progress, the 1w, with 
reference to the unborn l us and its 
rights , would only conside1 ·,uch rights 
as dating from the fi:- sign of 
movement. Any refen. ce to a 
pregnancy possibly exisl i1 g before 
quickening was mere s~ ::;p i cion or 
conjecture and was too te;~ uous upon 
which to recognize life , d te right t.o 
life and other rights , whicl, have their 
origin in true existence. 
Since the dis co very of the 
Aschheim-Zondek test for the 
determination of pregnancy and since 
• . . is (Monsignor Har rz ng t o n f 
Vice-0/ficialis for the Archdiocese 0 
Boston.) 
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reliable ·in better than 
percent of cases, the law 
andoned the former criterion of 
ing" and will now accept the 
of the Aschheim-Zondek test. 
in his famous Com-
, states: · 
is the immediate gift of God, a right 
by nature in every individual; and 
in contemplation of the law as 
as an infant stirs in the mother's 
For if a woman is quick with child, 
a potion, or otherwise , killeth it in 
b; or if anyone ·beat her, whereby 
dieth in her body, and she is 
of a dead child ; this , though not 
by the ancient law homicide or 
iiiAIIIIJhtPr "I 
English common law, it was 
that- a fetus was not a 
being, in the sense that the 
ion of its life was true murder, 
it was not a reasonable creature 
that it did not have a life separate 
independent of the mother but, 
on the ancient Roman Law, it 
that the fetus was part of the 
of the mother. 
declares: "The line must 
be drawn either at the point 
the foetus begins to live , or at a 
at which it begins to have a life 
t .of its mother's life , or at 
where it has completely 
into the world from its 
body. It is almost equally 
that the last of these three 
is the one whiCh it is most 
to choose .. . . The line has 
been drawn at this point by the 
England. " 2 
reference to civil matters and 
of the unborn child to hold 
to property and to inherit a 
' Blackstone says: 
"An infant, in the mother's womb, is 
supposed in law to be born for many 
purposes. It is capable of having a legacy, or 
a surrender of a copyhold estate made to it; 
and it is enabled to have an estate limited to 
its use, and to take afterwards by such 
limitation, as if it were then actually 
born."3 · · 
The Civil Law . of England clearly 
held that, once a child was actually 
born and could prove it was in 
existence in the uterus at the time a 
right would have been available to it , 
then it would enjoy the right of being 
considered in law a person from the 
very moment of its conception. Lord 
MacMillan, in 1935, in Elliot v. Joicey 
concluded that a fetus in the womb 
was to be regarded as a living person 
with reference to all matters that 
would be to its advantage but no other 
person could derive a benefit from an 
unborn child until it were actually 
born.4 
In 1907, the House of Lords in 
Villar v. Gilbey stated that the 
ordinary meaning of laws that refer to 
"children" or "issue" would not 
normally include the intrauterine fetus 
but a departure from the strict 
meaning would . be justified so that a 
fictional construction might be given 
. to them whereby an unborn child 
mjght be considered as already born 
for purposes of benefiting from a 
right to which he would be entitled if 
he were born. This fictional 
construction was always predicated on 
the fact of a subsequent live birth. 5 
In the same year of 1907', the 
English Court of Appeal in Williams v. 
Ocean Coal Co. Ltd. held that the 
fictional construction that had been 
applied with reference to real property 
in Villar v. Gilbey should be extended 
to include personal property so that an 
unborn child might be considered a 
191 
dependent under the Workers' 
Compensation Act and receive a 
benefit by reason of his father's death, 
which had occurred prior to the fetus' 
birth. 6 In 1909, The House of Lords 
affirmed this inteipretation.7 
In 1909, the English Court of 
Appeal, again considering the legal 
status of an unborn child, declared 
in Schofield v. Orrell Colliery Co.: 
"Of course an unborn child is not born - it 
is not an existing person in the ordinary 
sense of the word. All our statutes are, of 
course, framed in language suitable to ·the 
case of existing persons, and thus the 
peculiar fiction · of the law by which a 
non-existent person is to be taken as 
existing is not provided for in their 
language; therefore you can always show 
that the language of a statute does not fit 
the case of the unborn. But that is not the 
way to consider statutes when you . are 
dealing with cases in which the law has gtven 
the same rights to a non-existent child as to 
an existing child. The true way of 
interpreting the language of a sta~ te. in such 
a case is to assume that the child IS born, 
and then to draw deductions in the same 
way as we should in the case of an existing 
,8 person. 
In the first decade of this century, it 
was necessary to postulate this fiction 
of law, if legal rights were to be vested 
in and accrue to the fetus because 
embryology had not as yet advanced 
to the point where it could definitively 
state that human life existed from the 
very moment of conception, that the 
entire process of pregnancy was a 
continuous growth and development 
of this same human life, that the fetus 
was an entirely independent entity, 
dependent upon the mother only for 
circulatory and nutritional needs, that 
birth was merely one more milestone 
along the road of this development, 
whereby the human child could now 
exist completely separate from the 
mother and that the process of life, 
which began at conception, continues 
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uninterruptedly through i n mterine 
gestation, .the period of birth :nfancy, 
childhood, adolescence young 
adulthood and is completed . uy after 
twenty-five years of 1' " This 
important knowledge and d a would 
not become available until e fourth 
and fifth decades on this c,. tury. At 
that time, the mere fictic of law 
could be abandoned becau the law 
could now vest rights in th1. d us as it 
vests rights in other persom · .:: cause its 
truly human life, existing ·rom the 
very moment of concepti< , enables 
the fetus to be conside re ~ a human 
person. 
Iri 1891, an Irish Cour . ~ 1eard the 
petition of a female infm· who was 
seeking recovery for in juri,· which she 
had sustained, while · s1 i in her 
mother's womb, by reaso1 df being a 
passenger with her mothe; · m a trai~ 
that was involved in a co· ·.· ion. Thts 
accident and the ensu · 3 injuries 
caused her to be born 1 rmanently 
injured, crippled and defor ed. 
It was the claim of thE :nfant that 
her mother was quick witl" child at the 
time that she boarded a ·rain of the 
Great Northern Railroad of Ireland, 
that the mother purcha!->.: 1 a ticket, 
that the train was h ~t .. dled in a 
negligent manner, thus lnaking ~he 
railroad liable for the iP ; uries whtch 
she sustained and for whic;• she should 
be allowed to recover. 
The Irish Justices, whv decided this 
case, considered me rely the 
1 . 1' t . ,- and the con tractua 1mp 1ca lO ll:-. f 
liability of the Railroad by reason ° 
contractual obliga ti ons; t~ey 
. d · •- TortiOus complete!~ I~nore ~He onlY 
action, which m fact , was the ·cf 
action presented by the infant plantt i 
The Judges declared that, by reas;~d 
the purchase of a ticket , the Ra afe 
assumed responsibility for the s 
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of the mother but that this 
IIUlJii)JUJ .. u.ty could not be extended 
unborn, unseen child, who had 
no ticket · and who did not 
exist as far as the Railroad was 
d because they were not 
li.1llfo1rme:d in advance that the passenger 
pregnant and they could not 
~ -mably be expected to presume or 
this contingency. 9 
This decision has been criticized not 
for its failure . to consider the 
of Tort but also because of the 
narrow, limited and constricted 
of contractual liability .1 0 The 
of whether or not the 
sustained injury by reason of 
defendant's negligence - the 
issue - was riever studied or 
The remarks of Justice 
are worthy of note as a 
·of legalism; which 
tes on the narrow and 
view and entirely ignores the 
implications: 
llw, in reason, in the common language 
.-u .. uu, in the bond of physical union, 
instinct of duty ·and solicitude, 
the continuance of the world 
woman is the common carrier of 
child, and not a railway 
English jurisprudence 
not merely the rights of a 
to sue after its birth for injuries 
while it . was still in its 
womb, since it was truly a 
person at that time, but it also 
the right of a fetus to sue 
injuries even before it was 
As definitely favoring such a 
Justice Buller arguing against the 
of a fetus, stated: 
see what this nonentity can do. He 
vouched in a recovery, though it is 
PDrpose of making him answer over 
He may even be an executor. He 
may take under the Statutes of 
Distributions. He may take by devise. He 
may be entitled under a charge for raising 
portions. He may ,have an injunction, and he 
may have a guardian. Some other cases put 
this beyond all doubt. In Wallis v. Hodson, 
Lord Harwick says, 'The principle I go upon 
in the questio11 is, that the plaintiff was en 
ventre sa mere at the time of her brother's . 
death, and consequently a person in rerum 
natura, so that, by the rules of the common 
and civil law, she was to all intents and 
purposes a child as if born in the father's 
lifetime.' In the same case Lord Hardwick 
takes notice that the civil law confines the 
rules to cases where it is for the benefit .of 
the child to be considered as born, but 
notwithstanding he states the rule to be that 
such child is considered living to all intents 
and purposes . . . . . Why should not 
children en ventre sa mere be considered 
generally as in existence? They are entitled 
to all the privileges of other persons. " 11 
Many cases in the English and 
Australian Courts, centered on the 
right of a fetus to petition, even before 
its birth, for injuries sustained during 
its intra-uterine life, were decided on 
the principle that the suit might be 
instituted before birth but final 
adjudication of the claim could not be 
made until after the child had been 
safely born. 1 2 
Justice Martin in Manns v. Carlon, 
decided in 1940, shows the reticence 
of the Courts in Australia to enter a 
final judgment before the actual birth 
of the child: 
"It seems that what authority there is, is in 
favour of the view that a child en ventre sa 
mere has a right of acti<:ln, but whether that 
right is a vested right which enables a claim 
to be made on its .befalf before birth or only 
becomes vested when it is born alive is a 
· difficult question on which I do not intend 
to express an opinion, as, in any event, I 
consider a stay should be granted. But in 
any event the balance of convenience seems 
to be in favour of granting a stay of the trial 
until the birth of the child or further order 
and, if the child be stillborn, I grant liberty 
to the defendants to apply to strike out of 
the statement of claim all reference to 
it. " 1 3 
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B. American Law and Jurisprudence 
There has been a tradition in the 
American Law and jurisprudence with 
respect to the status . and rights of a 
fetus and there has been a growth and 
development in this area of the law in 
recent years , which has corresponded 
to medical research and new medical 
findings and discoveries. 
The rights of the · fetus might be 
ascertained readily and conveniently if 
we were to investigate separately and 
individually each category of the law 
that might have particular and specific 
reference to an unborn child. Thus, we 
shall proceed by considering the right 
of the fetus: to sue for injuries 
sustained during intrauterine life, to 
receive support , to inherit , to recover 
under Workmen's Compensation, to 
have a guardian appointed and. to sue 
in his own name by the intervention of 
a guardian, to be born and to live ; 
finally , we shall study the 
constitutional personality of the fetus 
or the rights of a fetus under a State 
Constitution. 
1. The Right of the Fetus to Sue for 
Pre-Natal Injuries 
In 1879, an Iowa court held that a 
father could not recover for injuries 
sustained by a fetus who had been the · 
victim of a miscarriage. 
In 1880, a suit was entered against 
the Town of Danville , Vermont, for 
indemnification for injuries sustained 
by an unborn, who subsequently died. 
This was one of the earlier cases of this 
type and set a pattern and a precedent 
for deciding similar cases for many 
years in the future. In this case , the 
Court ruled that the mother could not 
recover for the grief and sorrow she 
experienced by reason of the death of 
her unborn child. Grief was too 
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nebulous, personal and a' 
concept to warrant concret< 
and definite compensat · '1. . 
decision states: 
"Any injured feelings fo: 
miscarriage, not part of the p , 
attending it, ~e too rerr 
considered an element of da: 
plaintiff lamented the loss of l· 
such grief involves too much ~~ 
sentiment to be left to the C1 
caprice of a jury. If like Rae' 
for her children and wo 
comforted, a question of con t, 
is presented, too delicate to 1· 
any scales which the 
invented. " 1 5 
wing the 
naturally 
e to be 
:ge. If the 
offspring, 
d ement of 
!ecture and 
·, she wept 
i not be 
ing damage 
Neighed by 
has yet 
A more celebrated, bf· 
and often quoted case is 
v. Inhabitants of Nort/ · 
1884. In this suit , the m•. 
that, because of a del 
highway, resulting fro ' 
maintenance , she slipped . 
being gaur or five mom 
the fetus was born preJ 
lived only . ten or fift 
Justice Oliver Wendell 
Chief Justice of the SupJ 
Massachusetts, rendered 
He stated: 
:r known 
:~ Dietrich 
npton of 
1er alleged 
·-t in the 
negligent 
d fell and, 
pregnant, 
mrely and 
1 minutes. 
1)lmes, the 
ne Court of 
1e opinion. 
"But no case, so far as we rww, has evei 
decided that if the infant S' .vived, it could 
maintain an ~ction for injuri' received by it 
while in its mother's w .. ,b . . . .. If we 
should assume, irrespectiw uf prece~en~ 
that a man might owe a civi; duty and mcui 
a conditional ~rospe.ctive li <' ·:··i ~ty in ·tort t~ 
one not yet m · bemg, anl1 tf we shoul 
assume also that causing r. infant to ~ 
born prematurely stands on the same 
footing as wounding or poisoning, .we 
should then be confronted ':;y the qu~stJ~ rai~ed by the .defendant, vhet?er an mf=d 
dymg before tt was able to live separa 
from its mother could be said to have 
become a person recognized by the laW as 
capable of having a locus standi in court, 01 
of being represented there by~ 
administrator. . . . . As the un~orn ~ tbe 
was a part of the mother at the ttme 0 
injury , any damage to it which was not: 
remote to be recovered for at all 
Linacre QuarterlY 
by her, we think it clear that the 
sued upon does not embrace the 
tiff's intestate within its 
16 
Justice Holmes denied the right of 
ry because he felt the unborn 
' being a part of the mother and 
separate, distinct and independent 
her, had no personal existence 
the law could recognize and, 
, there was no precedent which 
allowed for recovery for pre-natal 
or for wrongful death. 
One might question the statement 
lack of precedent because Justice 
s could have considered the 
•cutratic· m of Justice Buller ( cf. supra) 
Thellusson v. Woodford to the 
that a fetus was not a legal 
has some interesting 
to make on Holmes' 
Holmes assumed from the lack of 
that the common law forbade 
suit, and at least one judge has 
the Dietrich case on the specific 
that Justice Holmes knew the 
law better than he did 
mrltlrn~>.'.u;""., v. Gorsuch (1951), 197 Md. 
It ts significant, however, that no case 
ever denied recovery for prenatal 
and it has been said that there was 
law on the point until Justice 
said there was. If this is so the 
law denial of recovery was ndt the 
for t~e decision but the result of 
notes that "Holmes' fiat is 
of the authority of the 
and that his opinion "bristled 
, 1 ~icta and an inexplicable 
The error was that the 
in considering the analogy 
the criminal law statutes 
an attack upon the unbor~ 
an action of tort, failed to 
two statutes and read them 
and thus, by neglecting the 
one and studying only the second, he 
drew a false conclusion. 
In any event, Holmes' opinion 
prevailed and was quoted as the law 
and authority from 1884 until 1946. 
In addition to · the fact that an 
unborn child was not considered as a 
separate and distinct entity from the 
mother and thus could not be granted 
le~al recognition or given legal 
extstence , there was added another 
complicating factor to the right of 
recovery for injuries sustained in the 
prenatal stage and this was the 
question _ of proving the cause of the 
injuries and their effect , if any, upon 
the subsequent birth or death of the 
fetus and the condition of the fetus at 
birth. In the Walker v. Great Northern 
Railroad of Ireland of 1891 (cf. 
supra) , Justice O'Brien raised this 
question of proof: 
'There are instances in the law where rules 
of right are founded upon the inherent and 
inevitable difficulty or impossibility of 
proof. And it is easy to see on what a 
boundless sea of speculation in evidence this 
new idea (to allow an action for prenatal 
injuries) would launch us. What a field 
would be opened to extravagance of 
te~timony, already , great enough - if 
SClence could carry her lamp .. . .into the 
unseen laboratory · of nature - could profess 
t~ reveal the causes and things that are 
htdden there - could trace a hair-lip · to 
nervous shock, or a bunch of grapes on the 
face to the fright - could, in fact, make 
lusus naturae the same thing as lusus 
scientae. There may be a question of 
evidence . . . . but the · Jaw may see such 
danger in that evidence, may have such a 
. suspicion of human ignorance and 
presumption, that it will not allow any 
question of evidence to be entered into at 
all."t 9 
This opinion of Justice O'Brien had 
great weight and evidence in 
subsequent decisions in American 
courts, where the right to recover was 
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·, ,. 
·. 
., .. ; 
·/: .: :·:· · ~ 't:'·.: 
" - ~ .... . ' .... ,. 
·.· :_, .· .. . 
denied bec~use of the difficulty in 
proving cause · and effect relationship 
between the prenatal injuries and 
survival and death, on the one hand, 
and condition ~t birth, on the other 
hand. 
In Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. 
v. Jordan (1935 ), the plaintiff alleged 
that she was involved in an automobile 
accident by reason of the defendant's 
negligence and , as. a result, her twins 
were born prematurely and on of them 
was bruised and died nineteen days 
after birth. The court quoted from 
Justice 0 'Brien, approved his 
conclusions arid declare.d that many 
fictitious claims would be entered if 
recovery were allowed. The decision 
stated: 
"The law gives to paients no cause of action 
for the loss of a child which dies as · a 
proximate result of injuries while it is still 
quick in the womb of its mother, even 
though such injuries may be inflicted by the 
negligence of the defendant. " 20 
This 1935 decision , which was the 
precedent for all Texas deCisions for 
the ensuing thirty years, was set aside 
by the Texas Supreme Court only in 
November, 1967. In this most recent · 
case , Mrs . Leal sued the C. C. Pitts 
Sand and Gravel Company for 
$50,000, complaining that her infant 
was born two or three months 
prematurely and died within two days 
and the premature birth was caused by 
an accident between her family car 
and the sand truck, which was driven 
in a negligent manner. The District 
Court and the Court of Civil Appeals 
denied any recovery to the plaintiff, 
but the Texas Supreme Court, in an 
opinion written by Associate Justice 
Zollie Steakley, recognized that the 
unborn infant had life and rights, 
separate from the mother, and granted 
compensation to the mother. 2 1 
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All the criteria and pr . ciples, 
denying recovery, are set for t. in the 
opinion of Justice Ronan in ·e Bliss 
v. Passanesi case, argued bet re the 
Supreme Court of Massach1 .·!tts in 
1950: . 
"A review of aJ1thcsc subsequent 
denying relief for prenata: 
demonstrates that they were base( 
grounds that there was lack of 
that there was due regard for th 
of staie decisis, that the unborn · 
part of the mother, that any cav 
between the prenatal injury anc' 
or condition of the child wou 
speculation and conjecture, 
recognition of any cause of acti 
of the child or its estate would 
fictitious claims." 
lecisions 
injuries 
1pon the 
ccedent, 
principle 
ild was a 
l relation 
he death 
' rest on 
~1d that 
, in favor 
1e rise to 
In considering the guments 
adduced fm the right . of ecovery, 
Justice Ronan continues: 
"We readily concede the strent :1 of these 
grounds, but there is also strf '1h in the 
arguments to the contrary, in ·~ding that 
based upon the practical e ficulty of 
reliable proof. " 2 2 
Chronologically , after t} Dietrich 
decision, the next importan : . ..:ase to be 
considered is the Allaire v. '7t. Luke's 
Hospital. The interesting as..)ect of this 
case is not the majority opin on, wruch 
reechoed the Holmes' d : tum but 
rather the prop h rc i c and 
future-looking dissenting ;;pinion of 
Justice Boggs. 
The plaintiff in this cas;: is a male 
infant, Thomas- E. Allaire, who sued, 
through his mother and· ai torney, St. 
Luke's Hospital in Chicago. Ulinois. H_e 
claims that on February 2. 1896, his 
· ·t I 
mother was a patient at said hospt a 
· to for purposes of a confinement pnor 
his birth, which was imminent. At th.e 
direction of hospital at tendants, his 
mother was being transported via an 
open elevator from the second floor to 
the obstetrical suite. She was seated 00 
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in the elevator and, as the 
ascended, the left side of her 
became entangled on some 
projecting out from the wall of 
shaft. The iinpact threw the 
to the floor of the elevator 
as a result, she was "greatly cut, 
bruised and the bones 
broken and said mother 
and grievously bruised, hurt, 
-..u ....... and wounded in her left hip, 
and body and other 
plaintiff was born on February 
1_896, and alleges that, by reason of 
accident in whiCh his mother was 
and the injuries sustained by 
he Was born injured and 
~c,rmc:~d. "His left foot, left limb, left 
and left hand were and became 
fiitherto have been and still are 
withered· and atrophied and 
said foot smaller than natural by 
than one-half and made thereby 
turn inward and the sole thereof 
and his said limb shorter than 
by more than four inches and 
hip, side and arm by reason of 
negligence and injuries became 
are made shrunken, atrophied and 
and his said limb without 
thereon and from thence hitherto 
so been and still are, and said 
thereby greatly and sadly 
for life." 
the hearings before the trial and 
courts, the verdict favored 
hospital. The infant then sued 
the Supreme · Court of Illinois 
the decision was rendered by a pe; 
opinion, which was adverse to 
Plaintiff. This Tribunal agreed 
with and affirmed the 
of the appellate court, which 
the findings of the Dietrich 
Walker cases. The majority 
favored the position that the 
unborn child, while in its mother's 
womb, is a part of the mother and not 
separate and distinct from her and 
becomes independent only when 
severed at birth; that the fetus was not 
in legal existence at the time of the 
accident; . that the mJuries were 
sustained by the mother and were 
recoverable only by her; that neither 
statutory law nor the common law 
· recognized the right of an infant to sue 
for prenatal injuries; that, if tradition 
and precedent is ' to be changed and 
new rights are to be accorded, this 
must be accomplished by the 
legislature and not by the courts; that 
an unborn child is recognized as the 
subject · of rights not by factual 
existence but by a legal fiction. 
Justice Boggs, in his dissent , agreed 
that there was no precedent, by 
adjudicated case, for allowing a child, 
once born, to sue for injuries-sustained 
in his mother's womb but adde.d: 
"Ap adjudicated case is not indispensable to 
establish a right to recover under the rules 
of the common law. Lord Mansfield 
declaied: 'the law of England would be an 
absurd science were it founded upon 
precedents only. Precedents were to 
illustrate principles, and to give them a fixed 
certainty'." 
Boggs continues: 
"At the common law, actions were 
maintainable to recover damages occasioned 
by injuries to the person or the plaintiff, 
whether inflicted intentionally or through 
the negligence of the defendant. The 
governing principle illustrated by such cases 
is that the common law by way of damages, 
gave redress for personal injuries inflicted by 
the wrong or neglect of another. The case 
disclosed by the declaiation under 
consideration is embraced within the limits 
of the principle thus recognized and it is 
clear recovery coul<J have been maintained 
at common law unless the fact the plaintiff 
was unborn when the alleged injuries were 
inflicted would have operated to deny a 
right of action." 
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Justice Boggs demonstrated an 
awareness of ·the true life and human 
existence of a fetus when he stated: 
••Medical science and skill and experience 
have demonstrated that at a period of 
gestation in advan·ce of the period of 
parturition the foetus is capable of 
independent and separate life and that, 
though within the body of the mother, it is 
' not merely a part of her body, for her body 
may die in all of its parts and child remain 
alive and capable of maintaining life, when 
separated from the dead body of the 
mother. If at that period a child so advanced 
is injured in its limbs or members, and is 
born into the living world suffering from the 
effects of the injury, is it not sacrificing 
truth to a mere theoretical abstraction to 
say the injury was not to the child, but 
wholly to the mother?" 
••A child in ventre sa mere was regarded at 
the common law as in. esse from the time of 
conception for the purpose of taking any 
estate, whether by descent or devise, or 
under the statute of distribution, if the 
infant was born alive after such a period of 
foetal existence that its continuance if life 
was or · might be reasonably 
expected. . . . . If, in the contemplation of 
the common law, life begins as soon as the 
infant is able to stir in the mother's womb, 
and that an injury inflicted upon an infant 
while in the womb of the mother shall be 
deemed 'murder if the infant survive the 
wound during prenatal life, but succumbs to 
it, and dies from it after being born, and if 
every legitimate infant in ventre sa mere is · 
to be deemed as born for all purposes 
beneficial to the child, why should it be 
supposed the common law would have 
denied to an infant born alive the right to 
recover damages for the injury inflicted 
upon it while in the womb of the mother? 
Had such injur-y, though inflicted· on the 
child while in the mother's womb, been 
sufficient to cause the death of the infant 
after it had been born alive, the common 
law would have regarded the injury as 
having been inflicted upon a human being, 
and punished the perpetrator accordingly; 
and, that being true, why shoud the infant 
which survives be denied the right to recover 
damages occasioned by the same injury? In 
the case at bar the infant, when the injury 
was inflicted, had, as the declaration alleged, 
reached that advanced stage of foetal life 
which would have, according to the 
experience of mankind, and according to 
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the medical learning of the age, ei· lowed it 
with such . vitality and vigor, td with 
members and faculties so far con, Iete and 
mature, that it could have r1 intained 
independent life, and the deat· of the 
mother would not have deprived i ' •f life. It 
is but natural justice that such ar nfant, if 
born alive, should be allowed to n •,ntain an 
action in the courts for injuries ~ wrongly 
committed upon its person whil ,o in the 
womb of the mother." 
Justice Boggs declared ~ at the 
precedent of the Dietrich c e could 
not apply to the present ituation 
because in that case, · the fe tt was not 
viable but in this controv( ·\y · "the 
child had reached that stage Jf foetal 
life when it was capable of mtinued 
existence independent of tt: mother; 
that its person was injured w 1in itself 
and it was afterwards born 'ive, and 
with sufficient strength · and maturity 
to maintain independent dstence, 
and still lives"; and that the de of the 
Walker case was not. applic< .Je to the 
instant litigation because, ir hat case, 
the Railroad did not knov 1 he fetus 
was in existence because tl . pregnant 
condition of the mother was not 
known but, in the present :;ase, the 
hospital knew the mother . 'as gravid 
and received her_ for t i express 
purpose of delivering her i.:1by; also, 
the Railroad may not h •. -.'e had a 
liability towards the un: .Jm child 
because no contractual !'. iationshjp 
had been initiated by the p:.,;chase of a 
ticket but, in the current , -1se at bar, 
the hospital assumed the responsibilitY 
to care for mother and chilo in view of 
the compensatio-n it received. 
Justice Boggs concludes: 
"If, in delivering a child, an attending 
physician, acting for a compensation, s?~uld 
wantonly or by actionable negligence mJUit 
the limbs of the infant, and thereby cause 
the child, although born alive and living, to 
be maimed and crippled in bodY or 
members, it would be abhorrent to eve~ 
impulse of justice or reason to deny to sue 
Linacre QuarterlY 
a right of action against such 
to recover damages for the wrongs 
inflicted by such physician. The 
owed it as a duty to 
though unborn, to bestow due 
~~~r.ttin""-' care and skill to the matter of 
!ln:servatiion and safety before and at the 
his birth. . . . .. Should 
IJeJlsat:ion for his injuries be denied on a 
--:- known to be false - that the 
was not to his person, but to the 
of his mother? The law should, it 
to me, be that whenever a child in 
is so far advanced in prenatal age as 
should parturition by natural or 
means occur at such age, such child 
would live separable from the 
and grow into the ordinary 
of life, and is afterwards born, and 
a living human · being, such child 
~f action for any injuries 
or negligently inflicted upon his 
person at such age of viabilitv 
then in the womb of the mother."t3' 
opinion of Justice Boggs, while 
--····· ·vu ... · '"" in ·the Allaire case, is 
an important and 
one, because it is the first 
opinion in American 
IJIU(lenc::e, which held that a living, 
fetus, while in the uterus, is an 
nt person with human life 
rights including the right t~ 
action to recover damages for 
wantonly and negligently 
and that natural justice and 
dictate there must be a legal 
for wrongs suffered. The 
opinion is also a landmark and a 
stone in jurisprudential 
'inasmuch as it laid the 
and groundwork for future 
, which would allow recovery. 
Boggs ration~le . prevailed in 
cases24 , while the Holmes' 
tri~mphed in most cases until 
2S 
court indica ted 
right to sue and recover 
be denied for reasons of 
and public policy. 2 6 In 
the same year, the Supreme Court of 
Canada declared that the injured child 
if he is born alive and if he continue~ 
to live, must bear the results of his 
injury throughout life and, therefore, 
he should have the right in justice to 
recover damages for his infirmity. 2 7 
In 1942, Chief Justice Brog-an, in a 
dissenting opinion, inquired why the 
courts felt bound to follow the . 
precedent, denying personality to an 
unborn fetus in tortious actions, when 
in other fields of the law, such a · one 
was recognized as an individual person · 
when it was to its benefit. 2 8 
The general reasons for continuing 
the denial of the right of the unborn 
to sue were: the lack of legal 
precedent, the inability of medical 
science, at that time, to determine the 
viability of the fetus and to prove 
conclusively a casual relationship 
between the negligent act and the 
injuries sustained and, finally, because 
of the danger of fictitious claims. 
In Damasiewicz v. . Gorsuch two 
important principles were set 'forth: 
that one must draw a distinction 
between the right to bring a suit and 
the ability to prove one's allegations 
conclusively; that the courts have 
al~a~s been ~ngaged in differentiating 
legitimate chums . from false claims. 2 9 
An Illinois court suggested that if 
justice requires that every · wrong 'be 
righted by the law, the legislature 
s,4<;>uld set forth by statute the right of 
the unborn to sue; this should. not be 
declared by the courts. 3 0 An Ohio 
court denied this assertion: "No 
legislative action is required to 
authorize _recovery for personal 
injuries caused by the negligence of 
another. Such right was one existing at 
common law"3 1 , 
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One final objection was raised to the 
right to sue f~r prenatal injuries and 
that was the danger that , if the right . 
were granted and recognized , a child , 
when born, could sue his mother for 
any ·negligence that might be 
attributable to her. 3 2 
Th~ first significant change from the 
Dietrich rule came in a decision of the 
Federal Court of the District of 
Columbia in 1946 iri the Bonbrest v. 
Kotz litigation .33 This was a 
malpractice suit in which the physician 
was charged with professional 
negligence during the delivery , which 
resulted in injuries to the child. Th~ 
causal relationship between the modus 
operandi of the doctor and the 
sustaining of injuries by the child was 
clearly proved, so that there was no 
danger of a fictitious claim. The 
decision remarked: "The law · is 
presumed to keep . pace with the 
sciences and medical science certainly 
has made progress since 1884 (when 
the Holmes' opinion was rendered)" . 
The important contribution of the 
Bonbrest case is the recognition that a 
viable fetus has the right to· sue for 
injuries which were inflicted in the 
latter stages of its prenatal existence 
because the viable fetus is an 
independent entity and separate , in its 
existence , from the mother. This is · 
emphasized in the sentence of the 
court: 
"Judicial opm10n .... has held 
that ... . prenatal injury offered no basis 
for an action in tort in favor of the child or 
its personal representative. ~his conclusi?n 
is predicated on the assumption that a child 
en ventre sa mere .... is so intimately 
united with its mother as to be a "part" of 
her and as a result is not to be regarded as a 
separate and distinct and individual entity. 
This rather anomalous doctrine was 
announced by Mr. Justice Holmes in 
Dietrich v. Inhabitants of 
Northampton. . ... As to a viable child ' 
being a 'part' of its mother - this argument 
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seems to me to be a contradictic · in tenns. 
True, it is in the womb, but i t "> capable 
now of extra-uterine life - ,1d while 
dependent for its continued devc 
sustenance . . . . it is not a ' r 
mother in the sense of .a 
element. . ... Indeed apart from 
non-viable fetus · is not a p· 
mother. " 34 . 
It is important to note th 
vests rights only in person 
real and in actual existeJ 
.mstituent 
iability,a 
t of the 
fiction of law; either p }'sica] or 
moral. In the early commc ' law, and 
unborn had rights , by a fie! .m of law, 
- as if they were exis' :1g - in 
property and under ',.Us. ~he 
embryological knowledge c · the tune 
would not allow for a docl . ·ne of real, 
human, physical existent 
unborn fetus as a separate, · 
independent person. Un<J· . 
rule the unborn fetus was · ;ons1dered 
as p;rt of the mother and, ., :· creby: the 
mother was the person w!· · sustamed 
the injuries and she was he per~n 
who recovered damages. h d ice Bo~s 
in Allaire was convince ', that the 
unborn fetus was an i· dependent 
person, who should be rc ·ognized as 
having the right, when bon ·. to ~ue. for 
prenatal injuries but his convictions 
were not followed. In Bunbrest, the 
viable fetus was considerec< by the law 
to be an independent ent i y in wh~rn 
legal rights could be vested - includmg 
the right to bring an a{·: lon. Later, 
other courts were to w nsider 3 
non-viable fetu~ as an indivi~ual 
person, who could bring a tort actiOn. 
The conclusion. is import;mt: the l~ 
vests rights only in persons and if t e 
law grants rights to a non-viable fetus, 
the law recognizes such as a person. 
. ·can So deeply entrenched m Amen . 
jurisprudence was the . H~lmes' ru~~ 
and the Die tric~ fmdmg that ntil 
remained the law m many. states u the 
the 1960's. From the ume of he 
Bonbrest decision in 1946 up to t 
there were simultaneous, 
legal positions: some 
ions were still denying a tort 
; some states were granting the 
to s~e provided that the fetus 
viable at the time of the injury 
was subsequently born alive ; other 
were according the right to a 
who was actually non-viable at 
time the trauma was experienced, 
providing that there was a live 
a third group of states was 
holding that the right to bring 
was recognized even if the 
was stillborn. 
lllfltne~o1ra was the first state to have 
of last appeal grant to a child 
right to recover damages for 
sustained in its prenatal life 
it had become viable and this was 
•
35 From.J946 untill967 , 
states have accorded the 
to sue to a child who was a viable 
at the time of injury and was 
ssed with live birth. 3 6 
1953, Illinois, in two separate 
reversed the 1900 decision of 
and finally adopted the 
of Justice Boggs as set forth 
dissent!ng opinion. 3 7 
this twenty-one year period, 
, in earlier decisions 
the Holmes' rule and reversed 
in later decisions and 
recognized the right to 
:~ lSSClchusetts provides such an 
1950, in Bliss v. Passanesi, Justice 
, noting that a precedent was 
established which was contrary 
Dietrich find ing, and 
the validity of their 
, maintained that : 
case not only established the 
this Commonwealth since its 
rendition more than sixty years ago but it is 
still supported by the great weight of 
authority in other jurisdictions. We are not 
inclined to overrule the Dietrich case. " 3 8 
In 1952, the Supreme Court of 
Massachusetts decided the Cavanaugh 
v. First National Stores, Inc. case. A 
child brought an action by his next 
friend alleging that on December 25 , 
1945 "he was a living entity , existing 
as a developing child, quick with life 
and viable in the womb of his 
mother .. . . who then was pregnant 
with him for six months ; that his 
mother purchased and ate unfit turkey 
supplied by the defendant ; that as a 
result she became sick and was caused 
next day to have a premature 
childbirth ; and that the plaintiff was 
born blind .... otherwise not fully, 
normally and naturally developed." 
After considering the rulings of recent 
years " allowing recovery by a child for 
prenatal injury .... we are not 
prepared to overrule · our · earlier 
decisions, which began nearly seventy 
years ago."3 9 
An action was brought by Zelia 
Keyes as administratrix of the estate 
of Duncan Reed against the 
Construction Service Inc. alleging 
"that while her .interstate was an 
existing viable child in his mother ' s 
womb , he received bodily injury in a 
collision of automobiles, causing him 
to be borm prematurely , and which 
said bodily injuries resulted in his ' 
death." The Supreme Court , while not 
actually deciding the case because the 
actual live birth of the child was not 
clearly proved, did return the ca~e to 
the trial court for the verification of 
this fact , thereby indicating that the 
right to sue and to recover would be 
recognized once all the facts , required 
by law, are established. 
The Supreme Court in its decision in 
1960 stated: 
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"We are asked to reexamine previous 
decisions of this court and again decide 
whether a child or his legal representative 
may recover in an action of tort for prenatal 
injuries caused by the negligence of a third 
party who was not the child's mother." 
Some quotations from this ruling 
should be pointed out and ca,refully 
considered: 
"Reasons generally advanced for recognizing 
a child's right of action' for prenatal injuries 
are: Natural justice· demands recognition of 
a legal right of a child to begin life 
unimpaired by physical or mental defects 
resulting from the injury caused by the 
negligence of another. A manifest wrong 
should not go without redress. Since the law 
protects an unborn child in the descent and 
devolution of property whenever it would 
be for the benefit of the child and in the 
enforcement of criminal law, the unborn 
child is regarded as a legal entity; therefore 
by analogy the law should recogn~~ the 
right of an unborn child not to be mjured 
tortiously by another. . . : . No new reason 
has been advanced in recent years for 
allowing recovery other than the growing 
body of precedent in favor of it and the 
progress made in medical 
science . . . .. This substantially is now held 
to be the law by a majority of the State 
Appellate Courts and by the District Court 
of the United States for the District of 
Columbia. . . . . We have held that when a 
debatable question has been considered and 
definitely decided in a reasonable manner it 
is usually the part of wisdom, in the absence 
of important new considerations, to adhere 
to the decision made. Although this 
doctrine is salutary it may be more 
important in a given case that th~ co~rt be 
. right, in the light of later exammatton of 
authorities, wide and more thorough 
discussion and reflection upon the policy of 
the law, than that it adhere to previous 
decisions. We think it advisable that in 
respect to the subject of prenatal injury t~e 
law of this Commonwealth should be m 
general in harmony with that of the large 
and growing proportion of the other States 
which have adopted in principle the rule 
J d B ,40 proposed by u ge oggs. 
Missouri, Illinois and New Jersey are 
other States that reversed earlier 
decisions that refused to allow or 
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recognize the right to sue fOJ 
i:njuries.4 1 
A 1955 decision from the 
Appeals in Kentucky under 
emphasized the legal person 
fetus within the terms of 
statute precisely because 
considered biologically to b, 
it was 
1 person: 
"The most cogent reason, we 
holding that a viable unborn 
entity within the meaning of 
word person is because, biolo1 
ing such a child is, in fact , 
existing person, a living human 
There are presently tl 
Rhode Island, Alabaina ali 
- that have not had the c 
to reverse their standin' 
simply because no cases 
have been filed recently . I: 
a ruling in 1960 that , 
case , Michigan will allow 
Some states - Nebrash 
and Alaska - by reasc 
reasoning in recent dec. 
doubt as· to what posi' 
taken in subsequent petih· 
,~ states -
Michigan 
·. portunity 
decisions 
recovery 
,s clear by 
. the next 
43 ~ covery . 
Clearly the majority oi .urisdictions 
recognize the right of a ·i1.ild to _sue, 
after his birth, for dama: t: s sustamed 
while a viable fetus. 
In 1953, there was a departure frorn 
the viability requirement. In the Kell~ 
v. Gregory ca&e , the pl<i intiff alleg;d 
that he was injured du ~ .ng the thIn 
month of his mother' s pregnancy. e 
. h. b t i1c' rt'ght to su grantmg 1m, as orn , 1..; . 
for recovery for such injury • Justu::e 
Bergan declared: 
. h thete 
"Legal separability shOuld_?,~gtn w ere Jcnof 
is biological separabuny . We ss of 
something more of the actual proce thaD 
conception and fetal development n~;cided; 
when the common law cases were 
we know makes it possible to 
clearly that separability begins 
The mother's bilogical 
from conception on is 
and protection, but. the fetus 
separate organism and remains 
;uu:ouigh<mt life. That it may not live if its 
and nourishment are cut off 
the viable stage .... is not to 
septar~tbillity; it is rather to describe 
under which life will not 
reason of recent development in 
science of embryology , whereby 
life is considered to be present 
the moment of conception, the 
can recognize the pre-viable fetus 
a person and vest it with rights, 
ly the right, if born, to sue in 
own name or by next friend for 
sustained before it reached 
or, if it dies before birth, the 
of beneficiarie-s to bring action 
the wrongful death statute. 
subsequent birth was verified, 
states have already accorded 
right to bring action . for injuries 
· by the non-viable fetus. 4 6 
University of Pennsylvania Law 
notes: 
injustice of excluding actions by 
fetuSes becomes manifest when it 
that the results of the negligent 
conduct are precisely the same 
the fetus was viable or not. Perhaps 
onsideration alone would have 
ind'uced most courts to drop the 
. But that development has 
by increasing awareness that 
viability is highly relative, 
its application on a multitude 
facts in different situations. 
is not only unjust but 
. . ... There is little doubt 
trend will continue, and that the 
someday make no distinction as to 
SUS>taiJrted in the previable stage as a 
~ cause of action for prenatal 
most recent case decided in 
of recovery for injuries received 
in the pre-viable state , the mother was 
about three and a half months 
pregnant when she was involved in an 
accident , which was allegedly caused 
by the defendant's negligence and the 
injuries .resulted in a premature birth 
and the prematurity brought on death. 
The child lived about two and one-half 
hours after birth. The Supreme Court 
of Massachusetts held that the 
intestate was a person within the 
understanding of the Wrongful Death 
Act and the administrator of his estate 
could bring action for his death. The 
decision declares: 
" In the case at bar, where the fetus was not 
viable, we must decide whether there is a 
sound distinction from the situation where 
the fetus is viable. . . . . In the vast 
majority ofcases where the present issue has 
arisen recovery has been 
allowed. . . . . There is no longer lack of 
precedent. The advancement of medical 
science should take care of most of these 
arguments (i.e. against recovery) . The 
element of speculation is not present to any 
greater extent than in the usual tort claim 
where medical evidence is offered and the 
issue of causation must be weighed with 
great care. . . . . We are not impressed with 
the soundness of the arguments against 
recovery. They should not prevail against 
logic and justice. We hold that the plaintiff's 
intestate was a person. " 4 8 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
has held that "medical authorities have 
long since recognized that a child is in 
existence from the moment of 
conception.''4 9 
Two courts have recognized the right 
. to recover for injuries sustained in the 
very first month of pregnancy - I'llinois 
and Pennsylvania. 50 Georgia has ac-
corded the right with reference to 
injuries in the second month of 
pregnancy . 5 1 
A further reason to justify actions 
for injuries sustained in the pre-viable 
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period is the consideration that recent 
medical findings indicate that much 
damage is done to the fetus in the first 
trimester of pregnancy. 
"Indeed .... . there is . substantial 
medical authority· which indicates that 
congenital · structural defects 
occasioned by environmental factors 
can be sustained only within the 
earliest stages of the previable period. 
Judicial disallowance . of actions for 
injuries to nonviable fetuses may well 
be a denial of the most meritorious 
claims. " 5 2 
By reason of the above evidence, it 
is abundantly · clear that the greater 
number of Courts recognize the legal 
personality of the viable fetus and the 
definite tendency for the future is to 
abandon completely the arbitrary 
distinction between non-viability and 
.viability and thereby recognize the 
legal personality of the non-viable or 
pre-viable fetus and accord the right, 
after birth, to bring action for injuries 
sustained in the first twenty-six weeks 
of intrauterine life. 
The above rights and actions are, 
however, predicated upon and limited 
by the subsequent live birth of the 
child. If the child is born alive and · 
even if it survives only a matter of a 
few minutes or a few hours, the right 
to sue for prenatal injury is 
recognized. What about the fetus who 
is not born alive; the fetus who dies in 
the uterus by reason of the very 
injuries sustained? Is there a right to 
his parents, to his beneficiaries to 
recover or to be compensated for his , 
death? 
The first reaction might be that if a 
child, when born, can sue for injury, 
certainly parents should be able to 
initiate action for his death, since 
death is a greater evil than injury. This 
would definitely be the logical 
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approach but the law cannot a.lways 
follow or be based upon pure l g.Ic. 
There are many factors to be 
considered in the cases of st. 1borns, 
e.g., what is the .real basis of T 'e right 
to recover? Is recovery of b· ,efit to 
the dead child or merely com1, nsation 
to the parents for their sm )w and 
loss? How are the legal derivat ons and 
analogies to be applied? Is rt .overy a 
compensatory mechanism o , merely 
punitive action for negligent Jnduct? 
Is natural justice involved n these 
death actiQns, whereby then. must be 
found a legal right for every · .. rong or 
injury? Is factual birth that j: 1portant 
a happening that its abs/ 1ce can 
restrict or deny the right of : :covery? 
However these question~ may be 
answered, it would appear that, as 
regards the right to recove · when a 
fetus is stillborn, there t ·nnot or 
should not be any distinc· ·~m as to 
whether the death occum. -~ in the 
viable or non-viable states. · '; iowever, 
the justification used in th pren~tal 
injury cases would seen equally 
applicable here, no matter ·.v~a~ type 
of death statute is involved. l ~ IS JUSt as 
illogical to permit recovery for. the 
estates of viable fetus and to deny It to 
those of nonviable fetuses; the loss to 
. h ,5 3 the pare~ts IS t e same. 
The same author notes: 
.. On the basis of legislative intcr1 t, ho~ever, 
limiting recovery ·to surviving mf~t~ IS .no 
more justi.f:table than a similar distinction 
between viable -and ~on~~ble fetu: 
Moreover, in a death action It ~s the pare the 
that are claiming compensation, not ·zed 
fetus. As long as the p~ents ru:e recoglll of 
to have a compensable mterest m the case the 
death caused by prenatal injuries whe~ 
0 fetus initially survives birth, there ISd ~ 
reason why recovery should be de~ebOtb 
stillborn cases. The essential in terest 1Jl nts. 
situations is the expectation of the par~ i~ 
In those cases where recovery is allow.e ~ 
in effect compensates for emotional dis.~,;. 
' · of 11"" resulting from frustr a tion 
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ion. . . . . The absurdity of 
the line of liability at survival is 
illustrated by the recent action of 
bJIISY.f1VanJia court *n granting letters of 
•utr:aticm to the estates of two of a set 
while denying them as to the 
three were allegedly killed by 
injuries sustained in ari automobile 
but while two survived birth for a 
minutes, the third was stillborn."54 
essential difference between the 
at law if the fetus is born alive 
stillborn is that, in the case of a 
birth, even though death ensues 
immediately, there is an action 
survives the death and that can be 
in the name· of the deceased 
the one . who administers his estate; 
if the fetus is stillborn, the 
brought by parents or 
in their own name for 
for their loss without 
reference ta the rights of the 
attack the requirement of live birth is, 
speaking, to abandon an interest 
and to embrace a policy that 
that the beneficiaries of a stillborn 
ought to recover under the Wrongful 
Statutes. " 55 
himself to this 
most states have compensatory 
death statutes - that is, the 
recovery is limited to the amount 
-.cease~ person could reasonably have 
expected to contribute to the person 
- such an action is usually worth no 
than nominal damages. Future income 
born dead had he lived is certainly 
and the expenses of raising the 
Would definitely be great, so financial 
loss usually cannot be proved. If the amount 
recoverable under the wrongful death 
statute is proportional to the fault of the 
defendant, then a suit on behalf of a baby 
born dead is meaningful." 56· ' .· 
Gordon, reflecting on this problem 
of compensation, declares: 
"Although it is true · that parents have been 
able to recover substantially for the loss of a 
minor child, the grant of compensation to 
the Qeneficiaries of such a minor, and a 
fortiori to the parents of an infant in utero, 
is in reality compensation for sentimental 
loss framed as though it were pecuniary loss. 
The award is pure speculation . . . . . A 
fundamental basis of tort law is the 
provision of compensation to an innocent 
plaintiff for the loss that he has suffered. 
Tort law is not, as a general nlle, premised 
upon punishing the wrongdoer. It is not 
submitted that the tortious destroyer of a 
child in utero should be able to escape 
completely by killing instead of merely 
maiming. But . it is submitted th~t to 
compensate the parents any further than 
they are entitled by well-settled principles 
of law and to give them a windfall through 
the estate of the fetus is blatant 
pUnishment. The actual - pecuniary - loss 
basis of compensation in wrongful death 
- actions has, where the award will be based . 
on speculation, given way in some states to 
a fixed sum of money. It has been suggested 
that the same principles be adopted in the 
unborn plaintiff class of case., 
It would appear that the entire 
matter of wrongful death actions can 
be considered from the point of view 
of the basis or the right ·to bring an 
action. Gordon claims that there are 
three bases - causative, legal and 
biological. 
I 
The causative approach completely 
. ignores the fetus and his right.s and 
considers merely the causal 
relationship between the negligent 
conduct or action of a possible 
defendant and the irijury sustain·ed. In 
this analysis, birth is the donor of the 
right to sue and, in the eventuality of a 
stillborn, there could not be any 
action. 
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The legal approach is based upon an 
advantage to be gained by the plaintiff 
- what is to his benefit. If a fetus dies, 
he can derive no advantage or benefit 
by bringing a tort action - the benefit 
would be to .his 'beneficiaries - and, 
thus, no action would be allowed. 
The biological approach depends 
upon the concept of life, which 
becomes the grantor of rights and 
wherever there is ·life, there is a right 
to sue for the extinction of that life. 
According to modern scientific 
investigation, this life begins . at 
conception. Since life and not birth is 
the basis of the right to sue, in the 
event of a stillbirth, a wrongful death 
action could be accorded. 5 8 
Despite the above-mentioned 
difficulties surrounding suits, entered 
on behalf of stillborns, some courts 
have recognized the right to sue and 
have entertained such suits. 
The first case in the United States 
was heard in the State of Minnesota in 
1949 - Verkennes v. Corniea. The 
mother had suffered a rupture of the 
uterus during labor and both she and 
the child died. A suit was filed on 
behalf of the deceased alleging · 
negligence a~ainst the attending 
physician and the hospital. 59 In 1954, 
a case was returned by the court of 
last appeal in Mississippi to the trial 
court so that arguments on the 
question of negligence could be 
weighed by the jury, since a directed 
verdict had been given in the original 
trial. This was also a malpractice suit 
and the return to the trial court, for 
the consideration of negligence, clearly 
implied that the deceased child had 
the right to bring the action.6 0 
Many states, in recent times, basing. 
their findings on the principle that life 
- ·and not birth - is the donor of the 
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right to sue, have recogni . ~d and 
entertained actions of recovr y with 
reference to stillborns. 6 1 
Tennessee, South C rolina, 
Massachusetts and Alaska Co . rts have 
declared that live birth cr< ,tes the 
fullness of the legal personalit , which, 
in turn, grants the right t f sue for 
recov~ry for injuries sustain< -; during 
intrauterine life. Thus, no a ion can 
be filed on behalf of a ch] .. who is 
born dead.62 
Without considering tht= possible 
pre-natal injuries and condi1 ms that 
coul<l beset· a fetus or withu t delving 
into the matter of negliges, ·e or the 
proof of negligence, - s1 ce these 
matters would be outside tl scope of 
this paper - it is advisab · , at this 
juncture~ to mention that t ; -~ right to 
enter an action might be : cognized 
and allowed but a verdic': favoring 
actual recovery cannot and . .r ill not be 
entered until there is legally •.;:;ceptable 
proof that the fetus was iL, ured and 
that the negligent act of ow , who had 
a duty towards the fetus was the 
cause of the injury and, in i l;e event of 
a subsequent death, that ·he injury 
was the cause of death. I !1 short, it 
must be established that thf defendant 
had a responsibility towards the fetus 
and that there existed a d ~'e ct causal 
connection between hi~ allegedly 
wanton and negligent act , the injury 
and the subsequent death. 
Under the · restri cti ns and 
limitations set forth above, the 
American Jurisprudence does grant the 
right to sue for prenatal injuries to 3 
fetus during its intrauterine life - eve~ 
though, in the opinion of some, thiS 
right may not be exercised until after 
live birth - since the law vests rights 
only in persons, the law, therefore, 
recognizes the non-viable and the 
viable fetus as a legal person . 
Linacre QuarterlY 
should be recalled that some 
have recognized and granted the 
· to bring suit on behalf of a fetus 
was never born alive. ' 
proponents of liberal abortion 
the position that, because some 
have insisted on a live birth 
an action could be instituted 
fa·ct seriously limits or diminishe~ 
right of the fetus - even to the 
of inferring that there is no right 
there is a birth. · 
writer would suggest that a true 
distinction can and should be 
between the basic, radical right 
the exercise of the right. Applying 
distinction to the matter at hand 
would ·be considered to hav~ 
right, from the moment of 
throughout the period of . 
~trau1terine life up to the moment 
to receive professionally 
care and the right to sue 
wanton and negligent act that 
cause him injury but the actual 
of the suit would have to await 
. The right to sue he has 
he is born; the exercise of this 
he has from the moment of birth. 
the basic right to sue for 
is vested in the fetus during 
, it must be concluded that 
r~cognizes the fetus as being a 
Wtth human life that must be 
. and with rights - among 
IS the right to live and to be 
(to be continued) 
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